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Introduction 
This chapter examines the transformation of culture in modern society by 
drawing upon the works of Pierre Bourdieu and Theodor W. Adorno. Far from 
intending to embrace the entire complexity of Bourdieusian and Adornian 
thought, the analysis focuses on some key dimensions that are particularly 
relevant to understanding the relationship between modern culture and 
modern society. This study seeks to show that comprehending the 
transformation of culture in the modern world requires taking into account 
the transformation of society as a whole. In order to demonstrate this, the 
chapter is structured as follows. 
The first section briefly elucidates the concept of culture. Given the central 
importance of the concept of culture for the analysis of this chapter, it seems 
sensible to clarify its different meanings. If the concept of culture can be used 
and defined in several ways, it is necessary to specify with which of its various 
meanings the present study is mainly concerned. 
The second section centres upon Bourdieu’s analysis of culture. More 
specifically, the Bourdieusian approach to culture allows us to understand  
the transformation of culture in modern society in terms of three significant 
tendencies: (i) the differentiation of culture, (ii) the commodification of 
culture, and (iii) the classification of culture. Taken together, these three social 
processes are indicative of the complexification of culture in the modern 
world, which manifests itself in the emergence of an increasingly powerful 
‘cultural economy’. 
The third section gives an overview of some of the key elements of 
Adorno’s analysis of culture. Similarly to the methodology of the previous 
 section, the Adornian approach to culture is scrutinised by differentiating 
three tendencies that are symptomatic of the transformation of culture in 
modern society: (i) the heteronomisation of culture, (ii) the commodification 
of  culture,  and (iii) the standardisation of culture. In essence, these three 
social developments are due to the colonisation of culture by industrial 
capitalism, leading to the rise of the ‘culture industry’. 
The fourth section offers a brief comparison between the Bourdieusian 
and the Adornian accounts of the transformation of culture in modern 
society. Instead of opposing Bourdieusian and Adornian strains of thought  
to one another, this section suggests that the similarities between the two 
approaches permit us not only to compare them, but also to integrate them 
and thereby to enrich our understanding of  the transformation of  culture    
in modern society. 
 
 
I. Preliminary Reflections on Culture 
The concept of culture is far from unambiguous, for it can be used and defined 
in different ways. Despite the variety of its meanings, we can distinguish three 
main conceptions of culture: culture as a sociological category, culture as a 
philosophical category, and culture as an aesthetic category. 
First, as a sociological category, the concept of culture refers to a 
specific form of life produced and reproduced by a given group of people. 
From this perspective, ‘culture is a description  of  a  particular  way  of life, 
which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning 
but also in institutions  and  ordinary  behaviour’  (Williams,  1994: 48). In 
this sense, culture can be regarded as a sociological, and indeed an  
anthropological, category which  describes a  particular –  that  is, a 
spatiotemporally specific – way in which a given form of human 
coexistence is organised.1 
Second, as a philosophical category, the concept of culture can be 
conceived of  as a human ideal, that is, as a distinctively human quality       
to which all mature subjects should aspire. According to this conception,   
the formation  of  humanity  depends  on  the  creation  of  culture.  Thus,  
the notion of  culture describes ‘a state or process of  human perfection,      
in terms of certain absolute or universal  values’  (Williams,  1994:  48). 
This view is situated in the German tradition of idealist thought, which 
suggests that culture can be identified with the realm of ‘the mind’ or ‘the 
spirit’. From this perspective, the existence of the transcendental realm of 
culture manifests itself in the existence of the material realm of  society:  
‘the cultural spirit’ of humankind is embodied in the consolidation of ever 
  
 
more sophisticated social institutions, constituting evolutionary expressions 
of the transcendental quality of  culture. In this sense, culture can be seen as 
a philosophical category which captures the species-constitutive properties 
of human civilisation. In other words, the project of society is driven by the 
anthropological quest for the development of humanity through the creation 
of culture: the Bildung der Gesellschaft (the formation of society) depends on 
the Bildung der Menschen (the education of the people).2 
Third, as an aesthetic category, the concept of culture denotes a distinctively 
human expression of artistic creativity. Hence, ‘culture is the body of intellectual 
and imaginative work, in which, in a detailed way, human thought and 
experience are variously recorded’ (Williams, 1994: 48). From this point of 
view,  culture constitutes a vehicle for creativity and imagination, capable    
of challenging and developing both the rational and the emotional potentials 
of human existence. Human subjects are capable of elevating themselves 
above their own existence through the existence of culture: it is by virtue of 
culture that the distinctively human exercise of  artistic transcendence can  
be realised. In this sense, culture can be considered as an aesthetic category 
which refers to the human capacity to attribute meaning to the world through 
the expressive power of artistic production. 
It is this third – that is, the aesthetic – perspective that is particularly 
important for the analysis of culture developed in the present chapter. This 
does not mean that the sociological and philosophical approaches to culture 
are irrelevant or that they can be ignored. On the contrary, all three 
interpretations have to be taken into account: the sociological, philosophical, 
and aesthetic meanings of culture are closely interrelated and should not be 
regarded as mutually exclusive. Every human form of life is permeated by ideals 
and allows for artistic creativity; human ideals are influenced by particular 
forms of life and can be articulated through artistic creativity; and artistic 
creativity is situated in specific forms of life and often inspired by human ideals. 
In short, the sociological, philosophical, and aesthetic potentials of culture are 
symptomatic of the normative, purposive, and creative nature of human life. 
Whatever theoretical approach to culture one may wish to defend, the 
transformation of culture in the modern world cannot be fully understood 
without accounting for the transformation of society in modern history: the 
rise of mass culture is inextricably linked to the emergence of bourgeois 
society. To suggest that cultural criticism is necessarily a form of social criticism 
is to recognise that culture is embedded in society. As remains to be shown, 
Bourdieu and Adorno articulate two diverging but complementary accounts 
of the relationship between culture and society. In the following sections, the 
transformation of culture in modern society shall be explored by looking at 
the theoretical approaches developed by these two thinkers. 
  
 
II. Bourdieusian Reflections on Culture: 
The Cultural Economy 
Bourdieu’s sociological theory can also be regarded as  a  cultural theory  in 
that it presupposes that the comprehensive study of society must be 
committed to the critical examination of  culture.3 Put differently, there is 
no general theory of society without a general theory of  culture.  In order to 
understand the  transformation  of  culture  in  the  modern  world  from a 
Bourdieusian perspective, we need to examine three social processes: (i) 
the differentiation of culture, (ii) the commodification of culture, and (iii) the 
classification of culture. 
 
 
i) The Differentiation of Culture 
Inasmuch as Bourdieu’s general sociology of society is a general theory of the 
economics of material practice, ‘his general sociology of culture is a general 
theory of the economics of symbolic practice’ (Lash, 1993: 193). A critical 
sociology of human practices must strive to understand both the economy of 
material practices and the economy of symbolic practices, for the former and 
the latter are intimately interrelated. If we acknowledge that cultural relations 
are necessarily embedded in material relations just as material relations are 
unavoidably situated in cultural relations, then we also need to recognise that 
every society produces its own cultural economy. 
The power of social stratification depends on society’s capacity to reproduce 
itself through an economy of cultural differentiation. The reproduction of class 
relations cannot be dissociated from the reproduction of cultural relations: in 
order to comprehend how social hierarchies are consolidated and sustained 
we need to account for the ways in which they are symbolically mediated 
and legitimated. To be more precise, economic and cultural relations are both 
interdependent and interpenetrative power relations: as interdependent power 
relations, they function in relation to one another to ensure their efficiency; 
as interpenetrative power relations, they colonise one another to guarantee their 
ubiquity.4 This is not to suggest that class relations can be derived from, or 
even reduced to, cultural relations; rather, this is to accept that the material 
power of class relations is inconceivable without the symbolic power of 
cultural relations. 
The rise of capitalism led to the ‘autonomization of intellectual and 
artistic production’ (Bourdieu, 1993 [1971/1985]: 112). For one consequence 
of capitalist modernisation is the emergence of relatively independent fields 
of cultural production. The modern world is characterised by the appearance of 
two main cultural fields:  ‘the field of restricted production’  and  ‘the field of large-scale 
 
 cultural production’ (ibid.: 115, italics in original). Both constitute social arenas 
which are aimed at the production of cultural goods. Yet, whereas the cultural 
creations of  the former are ‘objectively destined for a public of  producers  
of cultural goods’ (ibid.), the cultural creations of the latter are ‘destined for 
non-producers of cultural goods, “the public at large”’ (ibid.). 
Hence, the transformation of the cultural sphere in modern society 
manifests itself in the binary differentiation between the ‘restricted production’ 
and the ‘large-scale production’ of cultural goods. The more the former 
succeeds in separating itself from the latter, the more profound ‘the dialectic 
of cultural distinction’ (ibid.) turns out to be. To the extent that the restricted 
fields of cultural production can claim relative autonomy from the universally 
accessible fields of cultural production, the heterodoxy and idiosyncrasy of 
the former must be distinguished from the orthodoxy and conventionality    
of the latter. In this sense, the autonomisation of the cultural sphere in the 
modern world constitutes a particular characteristic of ‘the field of restricted 
production’, since it is capable of functioning independently of the imperatives 
that govern the mass-oriented nature of ‘large-scale production’. A relatively 
autonomous field is a relationally constructed social realm able to assert its 
existence by virtue of its own logic of functioning. Therefore, ‘the autonomy of 
a field of restricted production can be measured by its power to define its own 
criteria for the production and evaluation of its products’ (ibid.). Autonomous 
culture can only be created by its own creators, judged by its own judges, and 
appreciated by its own appreciators. 
The autonomy of every field is based on its capacity to create and maintain 
its own codes of legitimacy, through which it distinguishes itself from the 
imperatives that govern the logic of  other fields of  social reality.  ‘Thus,   
the more cultural producers form a closed field of competition for cultural 
legitimacy, the more the internal demarcations appear irreducible to any 
external factors of economic, political or social differentiation’ (ibid.). It is 
the gradual liberation from the constraints of economic reproduction which 
allows the cultural field to generate conditions of social refraction. 
If the ‘degree of autonomy of a field has as a main indicator its power of 
refraction, of retranslation’ (Bourdieu, 1997a: 16)5, the degree of heteronomy 
of a field has as a main indicator its power of assimilation, of absorption. The 
relative autonomy of the field of restricted cultural production is inconceivable 
without the relative heteronomy of the field of large-scale cultural production. 
Contrary to the former, the latter ‘principally obeys the imperatives of 
competition for conquest of the market’ (Bourdieu, 1993 [1971/1985]: 125). 
Thus, it is not only largely dependent upon the logic of the market, but it is in 
fact driven by it. The autonomisation of cultural production in the privileged 
sphere of the  société  distinguée goes hand in hand with the heteronomisation of 
  
 
cultural production in the popularised sphere of the société massifiée. Whereas 
the former is granted the power to bypass the imperatives of the market, the 
latter is largely governed by them. The conquest of artistic autonomy can 
challenge the ubiquity of economic instrumentality; the surrender to artistic 
heteronomy confirms the absorbability of culture by economic functionality. 
To be sure, all cultural fields – that is, both the field of restricted cultural 
production and the field of large-scale cultural production – are irreducible to 
other social fields (see Susen, 2007: 289). Even the ubiquitous power of the 
economic field cannot eliminate the potentiality of culture towards autonomous 
reproduction. It would be naïve to assume that the fields of artistic production 
are completely independent from the economic organisation of society, but it 
would also be misleading to suggest that the fields of artistic production depend 
entirely on the economic constitution of society. By definition, the relation 
between fields of artistic production and fields of economic production is 
characterised by both relative autonomy and relative heteronomy: the former 
are relatively autonomous insofar as they can never be totally determined by 
the latter; at the same time, the former are relatively heteronomous insofar as 
they cannot exist independently of the latter. Nevertheless, whereas the field 
of large-scale cultural production depends directly on the imperatives  of the 
market, the field of restricted cultural production derives its relative 
autonomy from its capacity to circumvent the logic of economic functioning 
that prevails in modern capitalist societies. The autonomisation of culture, 
then, is both a reality and a potentiality: as a reality, it is always already existent, 
challenging the hegemonic universality of large-scale cultural production;  
as a potentiality, it is always still to be realised, affirming the self-sufficient 
particularity of restricted cultural production. 
The binary differentiation of culture is symptomatic of the historical shift 
from traditional to modern society. In traditional societies, artistic production 
is largely controlled and regulated ‘by a small number of very powerful 
legitimising forces or agents’ ( Jenkins, 1992: 135). In advanced capitalist 
societies, by contrast, artistic production is increasingly divided between the 
realm of large-scale cultural production, which is driven by the imperatives 
of the economy, and the realm of small-scale cultural production, which is 
shaped by the quest for symbolic autonomy. 
 
ii) The Commodification of Culture 
Cultural production under capitalism leads to the creation of symbolic goods, 
a term standing for ‘a two-faced reality, a commodity and a symbolic object’ 
(Bourdieu, 1993 [1971/1985]: 113). Symbolic goods can be described as   
the ambivalent carriers of  both cultural and economic values that are only 
  
 
relatively independent from each other, since the cultural sanction may come 
to reinforce their economic consecration, just as ‘the economic sanction may 
come to reinforce their cultural consecration’ (ibid.). The potential autonomy 
of these goods is reflected in their symbolic nature; their potential heteronomy, 
on the other hand, manifests itself in their commodity character. In other 
words, under capitalism the cultural use value of symbolic goods is gradually 
colonised by their economic exchange value. The commodification of culture 
represents a central feature of late capitalist society, illustrating the ineluctable 
entanglement of use value and exchange value which permeates every market- 
driven ‘economy of cultural goods’ (Bourdieu, 1984 [1979]: 1). 
The economy of cultural goods can be regarded as an integral component 
of late capitalist reproduction. Inasmuch as commodities are increasingly 
culturalised, culture is increasingly commodified in late capitalism. The 
ambivalence of symbolic goods consists in the simultaneous articulation of 
their autonomy, rooted in the power of cultural creativity, and of their heteronomy, 
regulated by the logic of economic functionality. As symbolic objects, they 
reaffirm the undeniable strength of cultural forces; as material objects, they 
illustrate the inescapable presence of economic forces. To the extent that 
symbolic objects cannot break away from the parameters of the material 
world, economic objects cannot escape from the parameters of the cultural 
world. In capitalist society, symbolic goods are unavoidably absorbed by the 
imperatives of market forces. The particularity of symbolic goods stems from 
their cultural idiosyncrasy, just as the universality of symbolic goods derives 
from their systemic commodifiability. 
Both the production and the consumption of culture require that subjects 
are equipped with a subjectively internalised system of collectively constructed 
schemes of perception, appreciation, and action: the habitus.6 To be more precise, 
the habitus constitutes ‘an acquired system of generative schemes objectively 
adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted’ (Bourdieu, 1977 
[1972]: 95). Hence, the habitus forms a dynamic conglomerate of generative 
classificatory structures subjectively internalised and intersubjectively developed: 
the habitus exists inside subjects’ subjectivities, but it ‘only exists in, through and 
because of the practices of actors and their interaction with each other and with 
the rest of their environment’ (Jenkins, 1992: 75). As a sens pratique – literally, 
a ‘practical sense’ (see Bourdieu, 1976 and 1980) – the habitus represents    
‘a structured and structuring structure’7 by virtue of which actors shape their 
environment whilst at the same time being shaped by it. To the extent that 
society is driven by the functional imperatives of the cultural economy, human 
agency is permeated by the power of symbolic determinacy. A market of 
symbolic goods cannot be divorced from a market of symbolic capacities; a 
market of cultural fields cannot dispense with a market of a cultural habitus. 
  
 
To be sure, the commodification of culture is not limited to the creation but 
extends to the consumption of culture. For not only the production but also the 
perception and reception of culture become increasingly commodified in capitalist 
societies. The power of culture is only conceivable as ‘symbolic power’ 
(Bourdieu, 1992 [1977])8, that is, as a form of power which determines how 
we make sense, or how we fail to make sense, of reality by virtue of cultural 
codes. The more commodified the symbolic world in capitalist societies, the 
more our capacity to participate in the cultural world becomes subject to the 
force of exchange value. The more the market succeeds in imposing itself as 
the ultimate source of social legitimacy, the more it manages to transform our 
habitus into a subjective appendage of systemic commodifiability. 
The commodification of culture reinforces ‘the affirmation of the primacy 
of form over function, of the mode of representation over the object of 
representation, [...] of the saying over the thing said’ (Bourdieu, 1993 
[1971/1985]: 117), of the signifiers over the signified, in short, of appearance 
over substance. Cultural struggles are always struggles over the parameters 
of social legitimacy. In advanced industrial societies, a commodified culture 
is quasi-naturally legitimated by the systemic hegemony of the capitalist 
mode of production. The degree of commodification of  culture indicates  
the degree of colonisation of society by the market. In order for a cultural 
product to succeed in a market-driven society, it needs to prioritise its external 
form and representational transcendence over its internal content and social 
immanence. A cultural commodity draws its symbolic power not from its 
material substance but from its social significance. When we buy into the 
symbolic power of cultural commodities we are subject to both the powerful 
nature of the symbolic and the symbolic nature of power: we seek to acquire 
the value the commodity represents, and we aim to obtain the authority the 
commodity contains. To feel both represented and empowered by a cultural 
commodity means to identify with and subscribe to it. The commodifiability 
of culture confirms the ubiquity of the market. 
 
iii) The Classification of Culture 
‘If modernization entails the differentiation of an autonomous aesthetic  
field, then the appreciation of  (modern) art that this brings about entails    
the inculcation of a “differentiated” habitus’ (Lash, 1993: 197). The 
complexification  of   cultural  fields  manifests  itself   in  the  emergence   
of increasingly differentiated forms of cultural habitus. In order for a 
relatively autonomous aesthetic field to be created and appreciated by the 
‘distinguished’ parts of society, its members need to develop and share a 
‘distinguished’ form of collective habitus, allowing them to articulate their 
  
 
cultural idiosyncrasy by virtue of their codified legitimacy. The legitimacy 
of every social field depends on the legitimacy of its actors. Without 
necessarily being aware of their field-specific determinacy, human actors 
have a tendency to reproduce the legitimacy of the specific social fields in 
which they find themselves immersed. 
In order to convert themselves into effective carriers of legitimacy, social 
actors need to be capable of translating the schemes of classification and 
distinction which are imposed upon them by the world into parameters of 
differentiation and stratification which are projected by them upon the world. 
There are no reliable forms of social reproduction without effective patterns 
of social identification: identifying with particular codes of legitimacy, we 
situate ourselves in the world as reproductive participants of society. Powerful 
forms of legitimation require efficient types of classification. Hence, to the 
extent that the social world is divided by different fields with multiple codes 
of legitimacy, social actors are divided by different forms of habitus with 
various types of  capital. In order to participate in a cultural field, we need  
to acquire cultural capital. In order to play a part in the economic field, we 
need to attain economic capital. In order to be involved in society, we need  
to dispose of social capital. Our habitus is composed of different forms of 
capital, which enable us to position ourselves in different fields of society. In 
short, a legitimately situated actor is a legitimately classified and classifying actor. 
The struggle for and against classification is dialectical in  that  
‘economic and  cultural capital are both the objects and  the weapons of       
a competitive struggle between classes’ (Jenkins, 1992: 142, italics in 
original). The functionalisation of cultural  capital  by  economic  capital  
and the functionalisation of economic capital by cultural capital constitute 
two complementary social processes which lie at the heart of the cultural 
economy.  Inasmuch as the differentiation of  economic capital contributes  
to the reproduction of social stratification, the differentiation of cultural 
capital reinforces the classificatory power of symbolic domination. 
The economic and cultural reproduction strategies of society stem from a 
‘competitive struggle’ (ibid.) over power and resources, that is, from a struggle 
which defines the separation between the dominated and the dominant classes. 
This ‘[c]ompetitive struggle is the form of class struggle which the dominated 
classes allow to be imposed on them when they accept the stakes offered by 
the dominant classes. It is an integrative struggle and, by virtue of the initial 
handicaps, a reproductive struggle, since those who enter this chase, in which 
they are beaten before they start [...], implicitly recognize the legitimacy of 
the goals pursued by those whom they pursue, by the mere fact of taking 
part’ (Bourdieu, 1984 [1979]: 165). Hence, class struggle is a struggle over the 
legitimacy of a given form of social reproduction. 
  
 
‘Productive interests in the artistic field [...] find  “homologies”  with 
class interests in the social field’ (Lash, 1993: 197)9. Essentially, cultural 
classification systems reflect the socio-economic division of the class system 
(cf. Fowler, 1997: 48–49). The division of labour manifests itself in the 
division of culture: economic forms of social segregation go hand in hand 
with cultural forms of social classification. The instrumentalisation of 
culture as both a target and a vehicle of legitimacy is due to the fact that ‘art 
and cultural consumption are predisposed, consciously and deliberately or 
not, to fulfil a social function of legitimating social differences’ (Bourdieu, 
1984 [1979]: 7). Since cultural forms do not constitute invariant and natural 
categories, they can be efficiently integrated into the social construction of 
structural differences between human subjects. In other words, inasmuch as 
cultural forms are socially constructed, their contingency can be efficiently 
functionalised by the contingency of the class system of a given society.   
The spatiotemporally determined contingency of social domination is 
symptomatic of the relative arbitrariness of social classification. 
The  consumption  of  culture   depends  on  subjects’  capacity  to  absorb 
and interpret culture. Yet, our capacity to make sense of the cultural world 
reflects a socially acquired, rather than naturally given, competence: our 
perception of the world is shaped by our social engagement with the world. 
Just as the internalisation of  our external world cannot be separated from  
the externalisation of our inner world, the externalisation of our inner world 
cannot be divorced from the internalisation of our external world. 
Our perceptive faculty (Wahrnehmungsvermögen) is both a capacity (Vermögen 
in the sense of Fähigkeit) and a property (Vermögen in the sense of Besitz): as a 
capacity, it ensures that we are able to absorb and interpret the world; as a 
property, it determines how we absorb and interpret the world. Put differently, 
our perceptive faculty is based both on our ability to comprehend the world 
and on our mastery of the field-specific tools that determine the ways in which 
we comprehend the world. Thus, the consumption of culture through our 
perceptive apparatus is never a neutral but always an interested act, that is, it 
constitutes a social performance that is permeated by relationally determined 
schemes of legitimacy. 
Authoritative ‘talents of perception’ emanate from powerful ‘programmes 
for perception’ (Bourdieu, 1984 [1979]: 2). Culture and art can be systematically 
transformed into instruments of social distinction (cf. Robbins, 1991: 121). Even 
the seemingly most personal taste and even the ostensibly most individual form 
of aesthetic judgement contain implicit references to socially pre-established 
patterns of appreciation and perception. The  perceived  is  never  simply 
‘out there’ but it is always also ‘in here’: that is, in the eye of the perceiver. 
By definition, every perception of reality is composed of both a perceived 
  
 
object and a perceiving subject. The perceived object allows for the fact that 
something is to be perceived; the perceiving subject determines how it is to be 
perceived. Certainly, perception is not a solitary affair. Even the most personal 
perceptions are shaped by collectively constructed patterns of classification 
assimilated by socialised individuals. The perceiver exists never simply ‘in 
himself ’ or ‘in herself ’, but always ‘in relation to other selves’. Legitimacy is a 
product not of individual determinacy but of social acceptability. We become 
who we are in relation to what surrounds us. Our perception of the world is not 
absolved from our determination by the world. Only if the act of perception is 
understood in terms of its social and historical contingency can we succeed in 
comprehending the nature of culture in terms of its collective determinacy. 
Patterns of consumption need to create corresponding patterns of 
perception in order to generate successful patterns of legitimation. The 
omnipresence of socially constructed codes  of  legitimacy,  which  induce 
us to make sense of  the world in accordance with pre-established modes     
of appreciation, destroys any illusions about the possibility of a ‘natural 
empathy’ between the perceiver and the perceived, of a ‘disinterested 
relationship’ between the consumer and the consumed, or of a ‘horizontal 
exchange’ between subject and object. Our capacity to consume culture is 
always dependent on our ability to be consumed by it. There is no cultural 
empathy without social legitimacy. The empathy with a cultural object is 
inconceivable without the sympathy of a cultural subject, for the legitimacy 
of cultural objects depends on their acceptability by cultural subjects. 
Every act of  consumption presupposes an act of  acceptance; every act  
of cultural integration is accompanied by an act of cultural classification. In 
order to consume, we need to be able to classify. As consumers, we classify 
what we like and what we dislike, what we appreciate and what we deprecate, 
what we accept and what we reject. ‘Consumption is [...] a stage in a process of 
communication, that is, an act of deciphering, decoding, which presupposes 
practical or explicit mastery of a cipher or code’ (Bourdieu, 1984 [1979]: 2). 
All cultural struggles constitute classificatory struggles over historically 
contingent forms of perception. Put differently, all cultural struggles are 
concerned with both the construction and the destruction of legitimate and 
illegitimate forms of classification. 
As shown above, the differentiation, commodification, and classification of culture 
constitute pivotal features of the transformation of culture in modern society. 
They represent overlapping and complementary processes which illustrate that 
the structural conditions of the production and consumption of culture have 
been profoundly transformed under late capitalism. (i) The differentiation of 
culture implies the gradual separation between the field of restricted cultural 
production and the field of large-scale cultural production: ‘culture as a source 
  
 
of human creation’ competes  with ‘culture as a source of social distinction’. 
(ii) The commodification of culture has created a situation in which the use 
value of symbolic goods is colonised by their economic exchange value: 
‘culture for the sake of the created’ is confiscated by ‘culture for  the sake 
of the market’. (iii) The classification of culture is based on the imposition 
of different codes of legitimacy which reveal the historical contingency of 
different schemes of appreciation and perception: ‘culture motivated by 
individual creativity’ exists in relation to ‘culture programmed by collective 
legitimacy’. Hence, in modern society cultural struggles are struggles over 
the differentiation, commodification, and classification of culture. 
 
 
III. Adornian Reflections on Culture: 
The Culture Industry 
Adorno’s analysis of culture is highly complex and, as stated in the introduction, 
this chapter does not intend to offer an exhaustive account of the Adornian 
approach. Rather, it centres on three social processes which, from an Adornian 
perspective, are indicative of the changing nature of culture under late 
capitalism: (i) the heteronomisation of culture, (ii) the commodification of culture, 
and (iii) the standardisation of culture. 
 
i) The Heteronomisation of Culture 
The term ‘mass culture’ should not be conceived of  as synonymous with  
the term ‘culture industry’. The former may evoke positive connotations, 
depicting ‘the mass’ or ‘the people’ as legitimate creators and responsible 
carriers of  an autonomous culture. The latter,  on the other hand, brings      
to mind negative connotations, portraying ‘the mass’ or ‘the people’ as 
manipulated buyers and alienated reproducers of a heteronomous culture. 
Mass culture – if it is not imposed ‘from above’ but emerges ‘from below’ – 
has at least the potential of producing autonomous individuals able to 
construct their lives as creative subjects. The culture industry, by contrast, is 
based on the necessity of producing heteronomous individuals condemned  
to degenerate into instrumentalised objects. In short, whereas mass culture   
is not necessarily antithetical to the empowerment of subjects, the culture 
industry is only possible through their disempowerment.10 
One of the great paradoxes of modern society consists in the fact that 
‘culture is taken over by the very powers it had criticized. Consumer culture 
is  the  degradation  of  culture’  (Bernstein, 1991: 15).  In  other  words,  the 
  
 
term ‘culture industry’ contains a dialectical irony: on the one hand, the 
notion of ‘culture’ can, in principle, be associated with human autonomy, 
social emancipation, and improvisational creativity; on the other hand, the 
notion of ‘industry’ cannot be dissociated from human heteronomy, social 
domination, and instrumental rationality.  The culture industry robs culture  
of its ontological foundation, namely its raison d’être sans raison d’être. For, 
under capitalism, ‘culture has come to function as a mode of ideological 
domination, rather than humanization or emancipation’ (Kellner, 1989: 131). 
The emergence of the culture industry has led to the gradual abolition of 
radical criticism, since it is precisely radical criticism which could jeopardise 
its existence. From an Adornian perspective, however, culture needs criticism 
as an integral component of its very existence, since culture ‘is only true when 
implicitly critical’ (Adorno, 1967 [1955]: 22). 
The culture industry is the epitome of non-criticality, for its existence 
depends on the uncritical reproduction of its own imperatives. ‘The power  
of the culture industry’s ideology is such that conformity has replaced 
consciousness’ (Adorno, 1991 [1975]: 90). Society’s conflicts are allowed to be 
solved in appearance, in a world of surface only, since the solution of people’s 
substantial problems in their real lives would inevitably imply the dissolution 
of the culture industry as such. It is precisely because the culture industry 
manages to appear to have the capacity to solve people’s real problems that its 
social reproduction can be guaranteed. The domination of the dominated 
through the culture industry is nourished by the illusion that the dominated 
are the dominators of their own fate. As long as the ideological substance of 
this creed can be sustained, the material substance of the culture industry  
will hardly be dissolved. People’s structural heteronomy, imposed by late 
capitalist society, is maintained through the belief in individual autonomy, 
allegedly granted by the culture industry. In the culture industry, appearance 
is everything whereas substance is nothing, just as heteronomy is everything 
whilst autonomy is nothing. As long as the appearance of autonomy is 
controlled by the essence of heteronomy, the culture industry does not have to 
fear the dissolution of its own solutions. 
According  to  Adornian  parameters,  the  only true social function of  art 
is its functionlessness: ‘the necessity of art […] is its nonnecessity’ (Adorno, 
1997 [1970]: 251). Since art is precisely defined by its capacity to transcend 
from the mundane materiality of social life, it is the very quality of standing 
above the functionality of reality which characterises the functionlessness of 
art. To go beyond reality through art, however, does not mean to escape from 
reality. The illusory escape from reality forms part of the false promises of the 
culture industry. In the culture industry, art is not ‘functionless’ (funktionslos) 
but ‘functionfull’ (funktionsvoll), since its existence is degraded to the functional 
  
 
reproduction of the social system in place. Conversely, the functionlessness 
of truly autonomous art is rooted in its structural independence from the 
systemic reproduction of society based on the liquidation of autonomy. This 
is not to assert that art can be deployed and interpreted independently of    
the material conditions of society, as an idealistic perspective may suggest. 
Rather, this is to acknowledge that truly free and emancipated art is only a 
viable possibility if it is not completely absorbed and colonised by the material 
conditions of society. The potential social functionlessness of art consists in 
its capacity to transcend the mundane reality of material life while at the 
same time standing within this reality.  It is the transcendent immanence   
and immanent transcendence of art which enable art to autonomise itself 
through its very functionlessness from the heteronomy of the functionality  
of social reality. Removed from the functionality imposed by society, art 
stands in the centre of its own reality. 
‘If art were to free itself from the once perceived illusion of duration, were 
to internalize its own transience in sympathy with the ephemeral life, it would 
approximate an idea of truth conceived not as something abstractly enduring 
but in consciousness of its temporal essence’ (Adorno, 1997 [1970]: 28–29). 
Heteronomous art believes, and makes one believe, in its ahistorical and 
detached, or at least detachable, existence. The culture industry reinforces this 
systemic illusion by detaching itself ideologically from its material attachment 
to the foundation of capitalist society: class antagonism. 
The ‘relative’ autonomy of art is always an autonomy which exists in 
‘relation’ to its material existence. Heteronomous art and heteronomous 
culture, as produced and celebrated by the culture industry, can pretend to escape 
the material determinacy of  society; yet, the more art and culture pretend   
to be autonomous by ideologically detaching themselves from their material 
determinacy, the more slavish and erroneous they turn out to be. Real artistic 
transcendence faces up to its own societal immanence. We can only transcend 
our societal immanence by accepting it, since going beyond the givenness of 
reality presupposes being situated within it. The preponderance of the object 
can be challenged but never overcome by the subject. A subject that is critical 
of its own functions, a funktionskritisches Subjekt, is a subject that is critical of 
its historical situatedness, a geschichtskritisches Subjekt. The culture industry is 
uncritical both of its own function as a systemic conglomerate capable of 
instrumentalising culture and of its own history as a systemic missionary capable 
of maintaining capitalism. The real falseness of the culture industry emanates 
from its false realness: even the quest for ‘functionlessness’ (Funktionslosigkeit) 
fulfils a function and even the quest for ‘historylessness’ (Geschichtslosigkeit) has 
a history. To the extent that the function of the culture industry needs to be 
historicised in order to relativise the appearance of its functionlessness, the 
  
 
history of the culture industry needs to be functionalised in order to uncover 
the essence of its functionladenness. 
Inasmuch as any ‘artwork that supposes it is in possession of its content  
is plainly naïve in its rationalism’ (Adorno, 1997 [1970]: 27), any culture 
that makes the human subjects believe they are in possession of their  
identity is caught up in a dangerous game of existential self-sufficiency. The 
culture industry does not undermine but reinforces the illusion of worldly 
completeness by virtue of systemic effectiveness: by autonomising the industry 
and heteronomising culture it invites us to industrialise our autonomy and 
cultivate our heteronomy. In the universe of the culture industry, Aufklärung 
(enlightenment) asks not for an Erklärung (explanation) but for a Verklärung 
(transfiguration) of reality: under the unwritten law of the culture industry, 
the idea that everything can be sold is sold to us as the order of things. The 
order of the market is converted into the order of things. 
‘Art, even as something tolerated in the administered world, embodies what 
does not allow itself to be managed and what total management suppresses’ 
(Adorno, 1997 [1970]: 234). The structural integration of art into the totally 
administered world (die total verwaltete Welt) destroys any illusions about the 
innocence of culture: there is no culture beyond society, just as there is no 
society beyond culture. By definition, culture is situated in society and society 
is situated in culture. Our – tacit or overt – complicity with the givenness of 
reality always precedes our – possible but by no means unavoidable – break 
with the reality of the given. 
Even the most subversive work of art cannot escape its immersion in 
society.  Nonetheless, true art always refuses to be the tolerated appendage  
of the tolerating totality. What suppresses art is what invigorates the culture 
industry, and what suppresses the culture industry is what invigorates art. 
The administration of art is just as contradictory as the improvisation of 
administration: both are ultimately impossible. ‘Modern art is questionable 
not when it goes too far – as the cliché runs – but when it does not go far 
enough’ (Adorno, 1997 [1970]: 34). Administration is questionable when it 
goes too far,11 but it is not questionable when it does not go far enough, when 
it does not aim at its proper abolition. The questionableness of the culture 
industry derives from its ontological non-self-questioning. It ought to be the 
task of art, as a form of critical culture, to challenge the self-ontologisation of 
the culture industry, a form of uncritical Unkultur. 
‘Neutralization is the social price of aesthetic autonomy. [...] In the 
administered world neutralization is universal’ (Adorno, 1997 [1970]: 228– 
229). The neutralisation of the culture industry consists in the simultaneous 
heteronomisation of culture and autonomisation of the industry. The 
neutralisation is universal, but this universalisation is not neutral: it attacks the 
  
 
heart of artistic autonomy. ‘The categories of artistic objectivity are unitary 
with social emancipation when the object, on the basis of its own impulse, 
liberates itself from social convention and controls’ (Adorno, 1997 [1970]: 
231). The only convention of autonomous art is its non-conventionalism; the 
only control over itself is its non-control; its identity is its non-identity with 
social reality; its breaking through society is achieved through its breaking 
free from the chains of reality; in short, its immanence in-itself rests on its 
transcendence beyond-itself.12 
 
ii) The Commodification of Culture 
‘The principle of idealistic aesthetics – purposefulness without a purpose – 
reverses the scheme of things to which bourgeois art conforms socially: 
purposelessness for the purposes declared by the market’ (Adorno and 
Horkheimer,  1997  [1944/1969]:  158).  The  heteronomisation  of  culture  
is not limited to its administration but intensified by its commodification. 
The functionlessness of art is functionalised for the functionality of the 
imperatives of the market. As the purposefulness without a purpose has been 
transformed into purposelessness for purposes, the artistic character of art 
and the cultural character of culture have been overridden by the commodity 
character of society. To acknowledge that art and culture become gradually 
commodified means to recognise that even the most autonomous spheres    
of  society can be heteronomised by the market. It is not the autonomy of  
the market that has been heteronomised by culture, but, on the contrary,    
the autonomy of culture that has been heteronomised by the market. Since the 
most inner quality of  art, autonomy,  has been confiscated by the market,  
the potentialities of culture have been degraded to a state of impotence, of 
apparent powerlessness. The omnipresence of the market in every single 
social sphere seems to reveal its omnipotence. 
‘Culture is a paradoxical commodity.   So  completely  is  it  subject to the 
law of exchange that it is no longer exchanged; it is so blindly consumed in 
use that it can no longer be used’ (Adorno, 1997 [1944/1969]: 161). In the 
culture industry, culture is systemically – by capitalism – and systematically – 
by its administration – transformed into a centralised commodity. The 
culture industry has made culture lose its integrity and sovereignty, its 
autonomy and spontaneity. This is why it is the notion of Kulturindustrie, not 
the notion of Industriekultur, which characterises the commodification of 
culture in late capitalism: whereas the former implies that it is the industry, 
the market, which dominates culture, the latter could misleadingly suggest 
that it is culture which predominates over the industry, the market. In the 
concept Kulturindustrie, however, Kultur,  the ‘ideological prefix’ of society, 
  
 
unambiguously depends on Industrie, the ‘material suffix’ of society. For 
symbolic relations are always embedded in the economic realm of society. 
Hence, it is not so much culture that penetrates the market, but, on the 
contrary, the market that penetrates culture. 
It is worth pointing out that the notion of Kulturindustrie stems from a 
Marxist interpretation of society: although culture, as part of the ideological 
superstructure of society, must not be reduced to a mere reflection of the 
market, as the economic base of society, the former cannot be fully understood 
without taking into account the latter.  Culture should not be conceived of   
as a completely independent realm existing merely ‘in-itself ’, as an idealistic 
perspective might suggest; nor should it be reduced to an epiphenomenon of 
an omnipresent material base, as an economistic perspective might assume. 
The conceptual dichotomisation of society does not allow for its ontological 
binarisation. The holistic concept of Kulturindustrie indicates that social reality 
constitutes a unity of – directly and indirectly – interconnected particularities. 
In this sense, culture is a social particularity that cannot be divorced from  
the social whole. To the extent that the relationally constructed conglomerate 
of society is increasingly commodified by the market, culture – as a relatively 
autonomous social sphere – cannot escape its penetration by the economy. 
The most autonomous social microcosm can be colonised by the macrocosmic 
force of the market. 
A central problem of art under late capitalism consists in its incapacity to 
overcome the power of commodity fetishism as long as the predominance of 
the market is not ideologically challenged and materially undermined. Given 
its ineluctable situatedness in society, art cannot avoid this contradiction unless 
the contradiction itself is resolved. It is part of  the nature of  art to be part  
of the nature of society. ‘If art cedes its autonomy, it delivers itself over the 
machinations of the status quo; if art remains strictly for-itself, it nonetheless 
submits to integration as one harmless domain among others. The social 
totality appears in this aporia, swallowing whole whatever occurs’ (Adorno, 
1997 [1970]: 237). Regardless of  whether art is consciously opportunistic  
or deliberately self-sufficient, it cannot escape its absorption by the market 
machinery. Even the most anti-integrationist art is only food for the chronic 
integrationism of the culture industry. All artistic ‘ways out’ end up in ‘ways 
in’, all artistic circumvention remains trapped in social convention, all artistic 
solutions can be disarmed by social convolution, and all artistic euphoria can 
be converted into social aporia. 
The commodity fetishism of late capitalist societies describes ‘a situation 
in which things only have substance and value insofar as they can be 
exchanged with something else’ (Jarvis, 1998: 117). It turns society upside 
down  in  such  a way that the objects created by the human subjects become 
  
 
subjects that transform the human subjects into objects. The objectification 
of human relations goes hand in hand with the subjectivisation of economic 
relations. The gradual disempowerment of society emanates from the 
increasing empowerment of the economy. ‘The source of art’s power of 
resistance is that a realized materialism would at the same time be the 
abolition of materialism, the abolition of the domination of material 
interests. In its powerlessness, art anticipates a spirit  that  would  only  then 
step forth. [...] A liberated society would be beyond the irrationality of its 
faux frais and beyond the ends-means-rationality of utility. This is 
enciphered in art and is the source of art’s social explosiveness’ (Adorno, 
1997 [1970]: 29 and 227). 
Materialism cannot be transcended without realising it, nor can it be 
realised without transcending it. As long as the categorical imperative of 
society is the market imperative of material interests, art in particular and 
culture in general will remain unable to slip out of the omnipresent reification 
of society.  A  realised  capitalism  necessarily  involves  the  thingification 
of society (Verdinglichung der Gesellschaft); a realised materialism inevitably 
requires the socialisation of things (Vergesellschaftlichung der Dinge). Art carries 
the negation of exchange value inside its humanised and humanising 
subjectivity. Its repudiation of fetishised social relations is a core element of 
the sociability intrinsic to art. The splendour of the market is the mutilation 
of art. The splendour of art is the mutilation of the market. To realise 
materialism means to abolish it. 
 
iii) The Standardisation of Culture 
The consolidation of the totally administered world is expressed in the 
rationalisation, centralisation, and  homogenisation  of  society,  that  is,  in 
its gradual standardisation. The triumph of standard is the defeat of the 
individual. The regress of autonomous art is complementary to the progress 
of industrialised mass culture. The heteronomisation and commodification of 
culture is perfected through its standardisation. ‘[W]hile critical philosophy 
is inadequate without aesthetic experience, this experience needs critical 
philosophy’ (Jay, 1984: 158); while the culture industry is adequate without 
critical aesthetic experience, this experience does not need the culture industry, 
for the pervasiveness of aesthetic autonomy is antithetical to the preponderance 
of social heteronomy. Genuine art, as the epitome of cultural transcendence, 
needs individuality and spontaneity; the culture industry, as the embodiment 
of systemic immanence, needs conformity and standard. 
‘Culture is the condition that excludes the attempt to measure it’ (Adorno, 
1967: 91).13 The only control of art is its non-control. Authentic art cannot be 
  
controlled by any external systemic force; it cannot even be controlled by itself. 
Controlled art could hardly overcome a state of compulsory improvisation, of 
monopolised plurality, of standardised individuality.14 The culture industry is 
based on the economic necessity to measure culture, since it is its exchange 
value that is most relevant to the market-driven standardisation of society. 
The culture industry forces culture to wear the standardised corset of the 
standardising market. Only by destroying the corset of systemic 
standardisation, however, can culture become truly free and emancipatory. 
The standard of the culture industry is norm, its general feature is its 
generalisability, and its particularity is its universality. The standard of true 
art is its non-standard, its general feature is its non-generalisability, and its 
universality is its particularity. The market does not know any limits in 
imposing its own limits. Art does not know any limits in transcending its 
own limits. 
Art is about the possibility of expressing the disunity of our internal 
world with the unity of our external world. Art allows us to articulate the 
non-identity of our subjective world with the identity of our objective world. 
A creative subject does not necessarily intend to rebel against society, but it 
seeks to assert its individuality by acting upon and shaping the world. The 
creative subject will never leave the world as it is, but will always strive to 
explore what the world could – or even should – be. Our distinctively human 
capacity to reverse the universe is inextricably linked to our distinctively 
subjective ability to unify ourselves with ourselves through our disunity with 
the world. Human beings do not only have a deep-seated need to create their 
own creations; they also have a deep-rooted tendency to abandon their own 
creations. We are at peace with ourselves as long as we know that we can 
abandon ourselves. We affirm our unity with ourselves most poignantly 
when we insist upon our disunity with the world. The world is ours only 
insofar as we are of the world. We are of the world only insofar as we create 
our own world. We feel at home in the house of being as long as we remain 
the architects of the house of being. The space of humanity is a place of 
reconstructability. We are what we become. 
Our unity with ourselves depends on our potential disunity with our 
existence. ‘The question is not whether culture has lost its unity, but whether 
the possibility of expressing disunity may have been lost’ (Rose, 1978: 116). 
Standardised culture unifies art to such an extent that art is robbed of its 
ontological cornerstone, disunity. To unify art with the market means to divide 
art from art. ‘Illusory universality is the universality of the art of the culture 
industry, it is the universality of the homogeneous same, an art which even 
no longer promises happiness but only provides easy amusement as relief 
from labour’ (Bernstein, 1991: 6). The more standardised this domination, the 
more dominated culture becomes.  Ideology, including standardised culture, is 
  
 
a business, for ‘[a]musement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work’ 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997 [1944/1969]: 137). Culture is transformed 
into mere entertainment. Entertainment ossifies into boredom, guaranteeing 
that its perception by the masses does not require excessive creative or 
intellectual efforts. 
Art becomes artificial, as the unadorned Adornian critique reveals: 
‘[m]ass culture is unadorned make-up’ (Adorno, 1991 [1981]: 67–68). By 
virtue of its monopolistic artificiality, it aims at the constant monopolisation 
of society. As ‘consummated conflictlessness’ (ibid.: 67), art conceals the 
basic antagonisms of society. Art itself is translated into a decisive moment 
of the material reproduction of society. As a consequence, it has lost its 
capacity to transcend the systemic immanence of  social reality,  because in 
the empire of the culture industry it is not culture that has transcended the 
market but, on the contrary, the market that has transcended culture. Culture 
appears as the standardised and standardising appendage of the 
administered world. The forcing-into-line of society (die Gleichschaltung 
der Gesellschaft) leads to the total synchronisation of culture, equalling the 
factual liquidation of its normative potentiality. Standardisation is pseudo- 
individualisation, since it allows difference to exist only as long as it fits 
into the overall picture. The standardisation of culture is realised through 
the systemic and systematic ‘promotion and [...] exploitation of the ego- 
weakness to which the powerless members of contemporary society, with its 
concentration of power, are condemned’ (Adorno, 1991 [1975]: 91). The 
subtle totalitarianism of a standardised society degrades culture to a reliable 
vehicle of standardised domination. 
As shown above, the heteronomisation, commodification, and standardisation of 
culture can be regarded as complex manifestations of  the  transformation of 
culture in the modern world. (i) The heteronomisation of culture reflects a 
colonising process which attacks the autonomy of culture: ‘culture as a 
source of artistic creativity’ is replaced with ‘culture as a vehicle of systemic 
functionality’. (ii) The commodification of culture constitutes a colonising 
process which degrades culture to a functionalised appendage of the 
imperatives of the market: ‘culture as an expression of purposefulness 
without a purpose’ is converted into ‘culture as purposelessness for the purposes 
of the market’. (iii) The standardisation of culture stands for a colonising 
process which subjugates culture to a steering medium of an increasingly 
synchronised and synchronising society: ‘culture as a realm of transformative 
individuality’ becomes more and more of a fiction in the face of  ‘culture  as 
a machine of reproductive sociality’. Thus, in the modern world cultural 
struggles are struggles over the heteronomisation, commodification, and 
standardisation of culture. 
  
IV. Comparative Reflections on Culture: 
Between Bourdieu and Adorno 
The above analysis has sought to demonstrate that the transformation of 
culture in the modern world needs to be understood in the context of the 
transformation of society as a whole. Despite the existence of substantial 
differences between Bourdieusian and Adornian thought, the two 
approaches share some fundamental assumptions (cf. Karakayali, 2004). 
This is not to suggest that the two perspectives can be considered congruent; 
rather, this is  to  acknowledge that  they  possess some striking affinities.  It 
is the purpose of this section to elucidate these points of  convergence and 
thereby to put forward a critical theory of cultural production which sheds 
light on the relationship between (i) culture and economy, (ii) culture and 
domination, (iii) culture and legitimacy, (iv) culture and history, and (v) culture and 
emancipation. 
 
 
i) Culture and Economy: The Commodification of Culture 
Culture cannot be divorced from the material reality in which it is embedded. 
One central feature of modern society is the commodification of culture, 
constituting a powerful social process which is driven by the market economy. 
Both Bourdieu’s concept of cultural economy and Adorno’s concept of culture industry 
imply that culture becomes gradually commodified in late capitalist societies. 
To be sure, both concepts are indicative of a theoretical shift from the 
classical Marxist insistence on the material nature of reality to the neo- 
Marxist emphasis on the interpenetration of the material and the cultural 
realms of society. In advanced capitalist societies, the material economy is 
intimately entangled with the cultural economy. Metaphorically speaking, 
base and superstructure do not collapse but they are more and more 
intertwined, indicating how the material and the cultural dimensions of social 
life become almost indistinguishably interwoven. Due to its socially contingent 
and historically variable character, culture fits into the logic of an economic 
system whose existence depends on the production of socially contingent and 
historically variable commodities: 
 
By an effect of circular causality, the structural gap between supply and demand 
contributes to the artists’ determination to steep themselves in the search for 
‘originality’ [...], ensuring the incommensurability of the specifically cultural 
value and economic value of a work. (Bourdieu, 1993 [1971/1985]: 120) 
The abstractness of the new is bound up with the commodity character of 
art [...],  artworks  distinguish  themselves  from   the  ever-same  inventory in 
  
 
obedience to the need for the exploitation of capital. [...] The new is the aesthetic 
seal of expanded reproduction, with its promise of undiminished plenitude. 
(Adorno, 1997 [1970]: 21, translation modified) 
 
Given their potential for ‘originality’ and ‘incommensurability’, as well as 
for ‘distinctiveness’ and ‘newness’, cultural products meet the capitalist need 
for novelty and exploitability embodied in the commodity. The resourceful 
contingency of culture can be smoothly absorbed by the purposeful 
contingency of the market. Artistic creativity is thereby degraded to a 
cultural commodity. In capitalism, the symbolic value of culture is subdued 
by the exchange value of the market. 
 
ii) Culture and Domination: The Functionalisation of Culture 
Every form of  culture can be transformed into a constitutive component     
of social domination. One pivotal characteristic of modern society is the 
functionalisation of culture by the established social system. Both Bourdieu’s 
concept of competitive struggle and Adorno’s concept of social struggle are based 
on the assumption that culture and domination are closely interrelated in late 
capitalist societies. 
Again, both notions are symptomatic of a theoretical shift from the 
classical Marxist concern with class domination and class struggle to the 
neo-Marxist preoccupation with cultural domination and cultural struggle. 
Just as different forms of economic domination are entangled with different 
forms of cultural domination, different forms of class struggle are intertwined 
with different forms of cultural struggle. There are no efficient modes of 
material domination  without  effective  modes  of  symbolic  domination.  
In late capitalism, economic domination is increasingly mediated by, 
although not replaced with, cultural domination. Base and superstructure   
are not dissolved, but economic and cultural mechanisms of domination 
superimpose themselves upon one another; their functional reciprocity 
reveals their ontological unity. The social functionality of culture matches 
the systemic elasticity of the capitalist economy: 
 
Competitive struggle is the form of class struggle which the dominated classes 
allow to be imposed on them when they accept the stakes offered by the dominant 
classes. It is an integrative struggle and, by virtue of the initial handicaps, a 
reproductive struggle, since those who enter this chase, in which they are beaten 
before they start [...], implicitly recognize the legitimacy of the goals pursued 
by those whom they pursue, by the mere fact of taking part. (Bourdieu, 1984 
[1979]: 165, already referred to above) 
  
 
Social struggles and the relations of  classes are imprinted in the structure  
of artworks […]. (Adorno, 1997 [1970]: 232.) But the secret doctrine […] is 
the message of capital. It must be secret because total domination likes to keep 
itself invisible: ‘No shepherd and a herd’. Nonetheless it is directed at everyone. 
(Adorno, 1991 [1981]: 81) 
 
Domination in late capitalism is mediated by culture. In  advanced  
capitalist societies, culture constitutes both a vehicle and a motor of class 
domination. As  a  vehicle of  class domination, culture is  an  instrument 
of power; as a motor of class domination, culture is a source of power. 
Domination through culture is subtle but total, since it penetrates every 
single sphere of society far more efficiently and reliably than the most 
perfected totalitarian political regime ever could. The systemic mechanisms 
of cultural domination in late capitalism do not abolish the economic 
division of society; they only conceal this division. 
 
iii) Culture and Legitimacy: The Classification of Culture 
The power of every form of culture depends on its degree of  legitimacy.  
One important element of modern society is the classification of culture for 
the maintenance of social order. Both Bourdieu’s concept of affirmation and 
Adorno’s concept of justification allow us to understand how the legitimacy of 
culture can contribute to the legitimacy of society: 
 
Any act of cultural production implies an affirmation of its claims to cultural 
legitimacy […]. (Bourdieu, 1993 [1971/1985]: 116.) [T]he field of production 
and diffusion can only be fully understood if one treats it as a field of competition 
for the monopoly of the legitimate exercise of symbolic violence. (Ibid.: 121.) 
[A]rt and cultural consumption are predisposed, consciously and deliberately or 
not, to fulfil a social function of legitimating social differences. (Bourdieu, 1984 
[1979]: 7) 
No ideology even needs to be injected […], art becomes a form of justification 
[…]. (Adorno, 1991 [1981]: 57.) Mass culture allows precisely this reserve army 
of outsiders to participate: mass culture is an organized mania for connecting 
everything with everything else, a totality of public secrets. (Ibid.: 72) 
 
The stability of any social system depends largely on the degree of legitimacy 
it is able to obtain. The most legitimate legitimacy is a form of legitimacy that 
is not forced to be legitimated because it is based not only on tacit consent and 
implicit approval but also on integrative opportunism and doxic complicity. 
The legitimacy of symbolic violence is nourished by the outsiders’ participation 
  
 
in the cultural legitimisation of their own domination. Classified culture 
classifies classified people, just as much as classified people classify classified 
culture. The consecration of culture in modern society is a manifestation of 
the classificatory division of society as a whole. 
 
iv) Culture and History: The Contextualisation of Culture 
Every form of culture is historically situated. One crucial facet of modern 
society is the resignification of culture according to the imperatives of the 
market. Both Bourdieu’s concept of reference and Adorno’s concept of immanence 
point towards the fact that the power of culture is always contingent upon the 
horizon of meaning in which it finds itself historically situated: 
 
Science can attempt to bring representations and instruments of thought […] 
back to the social conditions of their production and of their use, in other words, 
back to the historical structure of the field in which they are engendered and 
within which they operate. […] [O]ne is led to historicize these cultural products, 
all of which claim universality. But historicizing them means not only […] 
relativizing them by recalling that they have meaning solely through reference 
to a determined state of the field of struggle […]; it also means restoring to 
them necessity by removing them from indeterminacy (which stems from a 
false eternalization) in order to bring them back to the social conditions of their 
genesis, a truly generative definition. (Bourdieu, 1993 [1987]: 263–264) 
The immanence of society in the artwork is the essential social relation of art, 
not the immanence of art in society. (Adorno, 1997 [1970]: 232) 
 
To contextualise culture means to accept its contingency by facing up to its 
intrinsic historicity. The constitution of culture in the modern world cannot 
be understood without taking into account the constitution of  society as       
a whole. The situatedness of culture within society destroys any illusions 
about the possible indeterminacy of culture beyond society. The creative 
transcendence of culture is possible because of, rather than despite, its 
societal immanence, for what seeks to write its own history needs to face up 
to its own determinacy. 
 
v) Culture and Emancipation: The Liberation of Culture 
Culture contains an emancipatory potential. One significant aspect of modern 
society is that it challenges us to exploit the emancipatory core of culture in 
order to abolish the emancipation of exploitation. Both Bourdieu’s concept of 
open work and Adorno’s concept of the unspeakable seem to suggest that the quest 
  
 
for the autonomy of human culture cannot be separated from the quest for the 
autonomy of human existence: 
 
The production of an ‘open work’ [...] [is] the final stage in the conquest of 
artistic autonomy [...]. To assert the autonomy of production is to give primacy 
to that of which the artist is master [...]. (Bourdieu, 1984 [1979]: 3) 
[T]here is no art without individuation, [...] art must be and wants to be 
utopia, and the more utopia is blocked by the real functional order, the more 
this is true; [...] only by virtue of the absolute negativity of collapse does art 
enunciate the unspeakable: utopia. (Adorno, 1997 [1970]: 32.) The categories 
of artistic objectivity are unitary with social emancipation when the object, on 
the basis of its own impulse, liberates itself from social convention and controls. 
(Ibid.: 231) 
 
The individuation of artistic openness is the opening of artistic individuation. 
Art liberates the subject just as much as the subject liberates art by speaking 
the unspeakable. The categories of liberating art are uncategorical for the 
categorical imperative of liberation is the abolition of categories, just as 
much as the realisation of materialism is the abolition of materialism. The 
impulse that drives the conquest of artistic autonomy can only be fully 
realised through the realisation of the quest for human sovereignty, which is 
always already existent in social objectivity. There is no realised individuation 
without a realised society, just as there is no realised society without realised 
individuation. As long as art can go beyond society, society will be able to go 
beyond itself. 
 
Conclusion 
Drawing upon the works of Bourdieu and Adorno, this chapter has explored 
the transformation of culture in modern society. Rather than seeking to 
embrace the entire complexity of Bourdieusian and Adornian thought, the 
chapter has deliberately focused on some key dimensions that are particularly 
relevant to the critical analysis of the relationship between modern culture 
and modern society. As demonstrated above, the transformation of  culture  
in the modern world cannot be understood without taking into account the 
transformation of society as a whole. 
The ‘cultural economy’ constitutes a market of symbolic goods driven by 
economic and cultural struggles. In essence, it is shaped by three simultaneous 
social processes: the differentiation, commodification, and classification of 
culture. (i) The differentiation of culture is embedded in a binary separation 
between the field of restricted cultural production and the field of large-scale 
   
 
cultural production: in modern society, culture oscillates between its symbolic 
independence from and its material dependence upon the ubiquitous power 
of the market economy. (ii) The commodification of culture cannot be dissociated 
from the culturalisation of commodities: inasmuch as culture is increasingly 
commodified, commodities are increasingly culturalised in modern society. 
(i) The classification of culture is an expression of the stratification of society: 
cultural struggles are basically struggles ‘about’ social classification ‘through’ 
representational classification, reflecting the deep material and symbolic 
divisions of modern society. 
The ‘culture industry’ represents both the product and the vehicle of an 
increasingly synchronised and synchronising society. Its powerful influence 
upon the constitution of modern society manifests itself in three simultaneous 
social processes: the heteronomisation, commodification, and standardisation 
of culture. (i) The heteronomisation of culture stems from the subjugation of 
artistic creativity to systemic functionality: the culture industry feeds the 
empowerment of the economy and contributes to the disempowerment of 
humanity by autonomising the industry and heteronomising culture. (ii) The 
commodification of culture is symptomatic of the omnipresent power of the 
capitalist economy,  in which the symbolic value of  culture is subdued to  
the exchange value of the market: the culture industry liquidates the 
autonomous core of culture by commodifying it. (iii) The standardisation of 
culture illustrates the homogenising power of totally administered societies: 
to standardise culture means to deculturalise culture; it means to unify the 
ontological disunity of art; in short, it means to divide culture from culture and 
art from art. The subtle totalitarianism of late capitalist society is equipped 
with the unwritten recipe of standardised domination. 
Despite the substantial differences between Bourdieusian and Adornian 
social theory, the two approaches offer complementary, rather than antithetical, 
perspectives on the transformation of culture in modern society. As shown 
above, the two accounts converge on five levels, allowing us to make a case 
for a critical theory of cultural production. (i) Both approaches are concerned 
with the relationship between culture and economy in that they explore the social 
implications of the commodification of culture. The search for originality and 
novelty, which is essential to the creation of artwork, matches the need for 
invention and reinvention, which is fundamental to the reproduction of the 
‘cultural economy’ and the ‘culture industry’. (ii) Both approaches highlight the 
relationship between culture and domination in that they study the social implications 
of the systemic functionalisation of culture. Social antagonisms seem to disappear 
behind the make-up of  the unadorned adornment of  systemic domination. 
(iii) Both  approaches  shed  light on  the  relationship between culture and legitimacy 
in that they draw our attention to the social implications of  the classification 
  
 
of culture. Cultural authority is one of the most powerful vehicles of social 
legitimacy. (iv) Both approaches emphasise the relationship between culture and 
history in that they study the social implications of the contextualisation of culture. 
Just as we need to recognise the historicity of society, we need to face up to 
the contingency of culture. (v) Both approaches insist on the relationship between 
culture and emancipation in that they reflect on the social implications of the 
possible liberation of culture. Emancipatory forms of society cannot dispense 
with emancipatory forms of culture. To reappropriate society would mean to 
reappropriate culture. 
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Notes 
1 On the concept of culture as a socio-ontological foundation of the human condition, 
see, for example, Susen (2007: 287–292). 
2 The German term Bildung has several meanings. In the most general sense, it refers to 
the ‘formation’ or ‘shaping’ of something. In a more specific sense, it can also signify 
‘education’, that is, literally the ‘formation’ or ‘shaping’ of a person. 
3 See, for example, Bourdieu (1984 [1979]), Bourdieu (1993), Bourdieu and Passeron 
(1990 [1970]), and Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992a: esp. 87–89). See also Bohman 
(1999), Fowler (1997), Lash (1993), LiPuma (1993), Swartz (1997), and Wacquant (2002). 
4 On the polycentric nature of social power, see, for example, Susen (2008a) and Susen 
(2008b). 
5 On the autonomy of the field, see also Susen (2007: 176–177). 
6  See,  for example:  Bourdieu  (1977  [1972]:  83),    Bourdieu (1980: 28, 90, and 122), 
Bourdieu  (1982: 16),  Bourdieu (1982:  84),  Bourdieu (1997: 44, 166, 205, and 222), 
Bourdieu (1998: 102), Bourdieu (2001: 129), Bourdieu, and Chamboredon and Passeron 
(1968: 46). See also Susen (2007: 188, 255, 296, and 299). 
7 On the notion of the habitus as ‘a structured and structuring structure’, see, for 
example: Bourdieu (1976: 43), Bourdieu (1980: 87–88 and 159), Bourdieu (1997b: 118, 
172, and 219), and Bourdieu (2001: 154). In the secondary literature, see, for example: 
Bonnewitz (1998: 62), Dortier (2002: 5), Jenkins (1992: 141), Knoblauch (2003: 189), 
Lewandowski (2000: 50), Liénard and Servais (2000 [1979]: 87), Vandenberghe (1999: 
48), and Wacquant (2002: 33). 
8 See also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992b. In the secondary literature, see, for example, 
Lash (1993: 196) and Susen (2007: 142–145). 
9 Cf. LiPuma (1993: 16): ‘[…] an “almost perfect homology” between the structures of 
culture and those of social organization’. 
10 See Adorno (1991 [1975]: 85). Adorno writes: ‘In our drafts we spoke of “mass culture”. 
We replaced that expression with “culture industry” in order to exclude from the outset 
the interpretation agreeable to its advocates:  that it is a matter of something like a 
  
 
culture that arises spontaneously from the masses themselves, the contemporary form of 
popular art.’ On the concepts of empowerment and disempowerment in contemporary 
critical theory, see, for example, Susen (2009a: 84–105) and Susen (2009b: 104–105). 
11 In Adorno’s writings, Auschwitz epitomises the dark side of a totally administered 
world. 
12 On Adorno’s insistence upon the emancipatory nature of art, see, for example, Susen 
(2007: 107–111). 
13 Cf. Jay (1984: 118 and 181n.22). 
14 Adorno’s arguments against the artistic legitimacy of Jazz are particularly relevant to 
his notion of compulsory improvisation. See Jay (1973: 186–187). Cf. Adorno 1991 
[1981: 76]. See also Kodat (2003: 114). 
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